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Sino-Western Rivalry as a New 
Trajectory of Neo-Imperialism
A Critical Challenge for African 
Diplomacy and Development
Africa’s underdevelopment and subservient status in the 
international political economy have often been analyzed as 
deliberate creations of Western influence, from the slave trade 
to neo-imperialism. But China’s recent phenomenal forage 
into Africa, which seems to provide a veritable alternative 
for Africa’s international engagements, is provoking rivalry 
from the West, whose traditional influence appears to be 
challenged. This paper examines the rise of China in Africa 
and argues that the Sino-Western rivalry, which the rise has 
provoked, implies a new scramble and trajectory of neo-
imperialism capable of worsening the already critical condition 
of Africa’s development. It concludes that, with China in the 
fray, Africa will only sink deeper into the vortex of a skewed 
international economic system, unless its leaders and people 
urgently design and use home-grown initiatives of thorough 
systemic reforms to develop their economies to a competitive 
level, which will, in turn, promote African states as respectable 
members of the international system.
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INTRODUCTION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICA 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE
!e attainment of independence by the colonially created African 
states between the 1950s and the 1990s enabled them to conduct 
external relations and implement foreign policies on the basis of their 
national interests. !ey were, however, sucked into the whirlpool of a 
complex international system which was (and still is) a contradiction 
of incompatible political economies. Basically, there are countries of 
the Global North and Global South. !us, African states continued 
to be tied to their former colonial masters, particularly Britain and 
France. !ese developed countries of Western Europe and the United 
States (of North America) are the dominant West in the post-colonial 
political economy of Africa. 
!e last two to three decades have witnessed signi"cant 
transformation in the patterns of Africa’s external relations and 
diplomacy. While established ties to the traditional partners still 
continue, economic liberalization and inept leadership combine to 
make Africa vulnerable to the courtship of some new trading partners. 
One of such new friends is China, whose amazing emergence as a 
major player and new trading partner of Africa has been an issue of 
great concern in the Western circles. China ranks third after the United 
States and France as African trade partners, and has overtaken Britain 
in volume of trade and investment, as well as in number of operating 
companies in countries like Ghana and Sudan (Akosile 2006, 58–59; 
Emeje 2006, 33; Tamen 2009, 155–67). It is also competing well with 
the United States in Nigerian oil and extractive industries. Indeed, 
China-Africa relations, which is not limited to trading, is, if nothing 
else, a major platform that has triggered a rede"nition of South-South 
diplomacy and a paradigm shift for African economies from the neo-
colonial mooring. !e implication of this is not lost on the West, thus 
culminating in an emergent Sino-Western rivalry, which, in turn, 
necessitates a contest of in#uence between China and the Western 
Powers, led by the United States of America, in Africa. 
!is paper is a historian’s attempt to interrogate the nature and 
patterns of the Sino-Western rivalry as a new critical challenge to 
African diplomacy and development in the contemporary international 
system. !ough situated in the historical context of post-colonial 
Africa, the paper focuses on identifying China (like its Western rivals) 
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as a purposive neo-imperialist and shrewd trader, not a benevolent 
partner. By way of a clearer perspective, the paper provides an overview 
of Africa’s transition from decolonization to its post-independence 
history, explores the nature and dynamics of Sino-African relations, 
and unpacks some core elements of China’s “Africa” policy. It concludes 
with a review of the chance of Africa to survive the intrigues embedded 
in the current realities of the rivalry, and a remark for African leaders 
by way of recommendations for the Continent to break even.
• • •
!e decolonization process in Africa can be generally situated in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, which initiated a chain of events 
that culminated in the disintegration of the European empires in Africa. 
!e major military operations in North Africa and ousting of Italians 
from Ethiopia by the British and Commonwealth forces, as well as 
the America-led Allied Forces sweeping of the French, German, and 
Italian interests out of all North Africa, all combined to sharply break 
the continuity and sustenance of colonial regimes across Africa ( John 
and John 2005, 872). On the other hand, the war severely undermined 
the will and capacity of the colonial powers to maintain their imperial 
holdings. Having stood against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the 
British people and members of resistance movements in Europe 
were inspired by democratic ideologies, anti-racism sentiments, and 
strident calls for freedom, resulting in more widespread opposition to 
any imperialistic tendencies. 
Also, the major powers had, at the end of the war, su"ered physical 
and economic exhaustion, while global leadership had passed to 
United States and the USSR. !ese two countries had been known 
for their rejection of colonialism—at least when practiced by others. 
!is stance can be understood in the context of their histories. For the 
United States, its colonial history and pro-freedom sentiments, which 
have grown over time as particularly encapsulated in the Wilsonian 
internationalism in the post-First World War diplomacy, are quite 
apt for understanding its stance against colonialism. !e in#uence of 
Wilsonian internationalism in shaping and molding American foreign 
policy has been so underscored that it o"ers a “better understanding of 
the highs and the lows of American diplomacy over these decades … 
and a better understanding of the tragedies of American foreign policy 
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that are yet to come” (Yergler 2014). On the other hand, the USSR’s 
choice of socialism/communism against capitalism, which is seen as a 
critical bedrock of colonialism, illuminates its rejection of colonialism. 
!is position had led to evolving proletarian internationalism, which 
was a social concept emplaced to unify working classes across nations 
of the world to work together for the defeat of capitalism as a global 
system. 
!e immediate import of this pervasive anti-colonial sentiment 
was that, by 1947, it was patently clear that decolonization was in 
full throttle in Africa, and a wave of independence swept across the 
continent shortly thereafter, such that by 1980, quite many African 
states were independent. A few examples include Ethiopia in 1941; 
Libya in 1951; Morocco and Tunisia in 1956; Ghana (formerly 
Gold Coast) in 1957; Nigeria, Congo (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo), Guinea, and Senegal in 1960; Tanzania in 1961; Uganda in 
1962; Kenya in 1963; Malawi and Zambia in 1964; Mozambique in 
1974; Angola in 1976; and Zimbabwe in 1980 ( John and John 2005, 
862–71).
But sadly, there are sundry developmental challenges in post-
colonial Africa. Democracy has fared badly, as over a hundred coups 
d’etat had left more than twenty military regimes in power, with some 
of them transmuting to one party civilian government. While the 
quantum of its damage to the body polities in Africa cannot be easily 
gauged, military coup ironically was often justi"ed on what the plotters 
would call leadership ineptitude of the political class. As Meredith 
(2013, 218–19) has argued, 
Whatever their real reasons for seizing power, coup leaders 
invariably stressed the strictly temporary nature of military 
rule. All they required, they said, was su!cient time to clear 
up the morass of corruption, mismanagement, tribalism, 
nepotism, and other assorted malpractices they claimed 
prompted them to intervene and restore honest and e!cient 
government and national integrity.
!e overall economic lot of Africa is pathetic: twenty-nine of 
world’s thirty-four poorest nations are found in Africa; and there is 
an overreliance on foreign expertise, and an uncontrolled population 
growth rate (32 percent a year, over 40 percent in Kenya). It can be 
surmised that some African states are, by any economic measure, worse 
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o! than they were as colonies, and some have appeared repeatedly 
on the FAO’s emergency list ( John and John 2005, 872). "ere is 
perpetuation of the colonially created arti#cial territorial framework, 
thus forcing post-colonial governments to grapple with the problem 
of creating and preserving national unity. Poverty, underdevelopment, 
and uneven distribution and under-utilization of natural resources 
are solution-defying problems of post-colonial Africa. Consequently, 
African states are always in the category of countries of the Global 
South, which, apart from some exceptions in Asia (e.g., China, Japan, 
India, etc.) and South America (e.g., Brazil), are largely poor and weak 
(Okajare 2008, 104–7).
"e greatest challenge of post-colonial Africa is leadership. While 
it can be argued that indolent followership accompanies leadership, it 
should be noted that leadership bears the compass of any given society. 
"us, it is imperative that leadership improves, so as to provide right 
focus for the society. "e leadership crisis in Africa has been aptly 
captured in the following passage:
A tragedy is befalling Africa—the tragedy of insensitive, 
retrogressive and unintelligent leaders. It is almost as if it is 
not the same Africa that produced the likes of Julius Nyerere, 
Kenneth Kaunda, Kwame Nkrumah, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
Nelson Mandela, among others. With the turmoil in Mali, the 
deployment of drones in Niger Republic and Burkina Faso, 
the likelihood of US-Africa Command, and the collapse of 
state economies, the continent . . . is being opened up for 
recolonisation. Sadly, African leaders whose poor judgment 
led them to recently accept the new $200m AU [African 
Union] headquarters in Addis Ababa as a gift from China, 
have become inured to the dangers of external control which 
their incompetence and lack of foresight are engendering. 
(The Nation 2013) 
"e above is further supported by the following passage:
It is evident that the quality of leadership in the region, 
nay, in Africa as a whole has declined horribly. There are 
no brilliant and perceptive leaders conversant with their 
countries’ histories, nor even keenly aware of the dangers of 
neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. The mediocre leaders 
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rule their countries badly and embrace desperate methods, 
including opening up their countries to harmful external 
influences, to mitigate the e!ects of their misrule. (ibid.)
!e passages quoted above vividly describe the lot of post-colonial 
African states. !eir leadership morass can be taken as an o"shoot 
of Africa’s colonial history, in view of the fact that the post-colonial 
African leaders inherited elitist leadership traits and tendencies from 
the colonial masters. !ey have consistently strengthened such traits 
and tendencies since independence.
Admittedly, some prominent leaders of the continent did well to 
struggle for the liberation of their di"erent countries from the colonial 
stranglehold of imperial Europe. !eir e"orts culminated in the 
attainment of independence by their countries, and quite a good number 
of them led their countries in various capacities in the early years of 
the post-independence era. !ere are substantial proofs to conclude 
that they provided robust leadership and good guidance to chart the 
course of development and nation-building for their countries. !ree 
examples su#ce here. !e $rst example: Julius Nyerere led Tangayinka 
to independence in 1961 and began to lead Tanzania, a union of 
Tangayinka and Zanzibar, from 1964, when the new Republic was 
created. He provided a very good example of incorruptible leadership 
and the doctrine of a free Republic in truth and in deed. With his 
radical foreign policy action condemning the British role in Rhodesia, 
his swift diplomacy in securing China’s interest-free loan in 1970 to 
construct the Dar es Salaam-Zambia railway, and, more importantly, 
with the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Nyerere demonstrated that he was 
an unconventional leader of his time. !e Declaration vividly captured 
his intent to block the pilfering of national resources and underscore 
people’s ownership of their resources; it also cautioned leaders against 
bait from capitalist nations, and encouraged an austere lifestyle for 
political o#cials who should draw only one salary (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica 2010c).!e second example: Seretse Khama led Botswana 
(formerly Bechuanaland) $rst as Prime Minister from 1964 to 1966, 
then as President from 1966 to 1980. After the $rst $ve years of 
independence, when the country had to depend on Britain for survival, 
Botswana began to play active roles in international politics, thanks 
to its steadily growing economy and strong $nancial muscle from 
the 1970s to 1980s. Today, Botswana is one of the few fairly stable 
economies and peaceful states in Africa and in the !ird World, with 
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an outstanding record of e!ective management of the HIV/Aids 
scourge. It was the "rst African state to make free anti-retroviral drugs 
available to all its citizens (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010a). #e third 
and last example: #at Nelson Mandela was the architect of modern 
South Africa is a universally acknowledged fact that bears no repeating 
here. From his multi-dimensional activism, his twenty-seven year 
con"nement under the most harrowing experience in Robin Island, 
his emergence as the "rst black President of South Africa in 1994, to 
his statesmanly disengagement from o$ce in 1999, and his becoming 
a towering father "gure not only for South Africa but the entire black 
world—Mandela was able to carve an uncommon niche for himself, 
such that he remains a great reference point for emergent leaders in 
Africa and beyond.     
But the trend has changed in recent times; Africa su!ers from a 
leadership de"cit. #is de"cit has culminated in the vulnerability of 
the continent to the manipulative tendencies of the leading powers 
of the contemporary international system. #ese tendencies are, at 
best, modern day replicas of the African experience in the periods of 
the slave trade and colonial rule, when some members of the African 
leadership elite collaborated with the foreign overlords to subjugate 
Africans. In turn, the continent has now become a theatre of Sino-
Western rivalry, which is a new trajectory of neo-imperialism as will 
be shown later in this paper.
NATURE OF SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS AND 
ELEMENTS OF CHINA’S “AFRICA” POLICY
It is a historical truism that Africa’s relations with the West—which 
began mainly with the slave trade across the Atlantic in the "fteenth 
century, and ran through trade in sylvan goods, company rule, 
missionary activities, and colonial rule, which ended in the twentieth 
century—has been well explored, and thus bears no repeating here. 
But China’s relations with Africa did not "t into the same remit as 
above. In the contemporary context, Sino-African relations may be 
taken to imply the political, economic, and cultural relations between 
China and Africa, particularly in the post-colonial epoch of the 
latter’s history. But it is important to note that Sino-African relations 
predated the contemporary time. According to Freeman-Grenville 
(1975), the earliest known mention of Africa in Chinese historical 
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sources can be found in the Yu-yang-tsa-tsu by Tuan Ch’eng-Shih, 
who died in 863 AD. In this collection of general exploration 
knowledge, Ch’eng-Shih writes about the “land of po-pa-li,” which is 
today known as Somalia. He adds that “In 1226 AD, Chao Ju-Kua, 
commissioner of Foreign Trade at Guanzhou in the Fujian province 
of China completed his Chu-fan-Chil (Description of Barbarous 
Peoples). It discusses Zanzbar (Ts’ Ong-Pa) and Somalia (Pi-Pa-
Lo).”
It would seem that the information derived from the previous 
quote about Africa eventually stimulated the hunger for exploration 
and the desire to know Africa among Chinese o!cials’ circles about 
two hundred years later. Of course, it is to the voyages of the "fteenth 
century from China that we can trace the actual origin of Sino-
African contact. #is began with the series of voyages by the Chinese 
$eet called “Star Raft,” commanded by Admiral Zheng He in the 
early years of the "fteenth century. In one of the voyages, Zheng 
He landed in the East African coast in 1418, and repeated the visit 
between 1421–1422 and 1431–1433 (Snow 1988). #ese voyages, 
even if brief, took place during the era of Ming Dynasty in Chinese 
history. #ey signi"cantly marked the humble beginning of Sino-
African relations, and were essentially intended to spread Chinese 
cultural attributes to Africa through gifts and titles from the Ming 
Emperor to local African rulers. #is, in turn, led to the establishment 
of a broad tribute-paying circle from the Horn of Africa to the 
Mozambican Channel (Orngu 2009, 97). #ese voyages by Zheng 
are in, modern times, a major platform for Chinese diplomats in 
Africa to echo the age-long contact between their country and the 
continent. For example, in 2007, the Chinese ambassador to South 
Africa swiftly employed the visits to remind Africans of the trading 
relations between Africa and China, as Ayuba (2009, 131) notes:
Zhang took to the place he visited tea, Chinaware, silk and 
technology. He did not occupy an inch of foreign territory, 
nor did he take a single slave [unlike visitors from the 
West]. What he brought to the outside world was peace 
and civilisation. This fully reflects the good faith of ancient 
Chinese people in strengthening exchanges with relevant 
countries and their people. This peace-loving culture has 
taken deep root in the minds and hearts of Chinese people 
of all generations.
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It should be noted that this statement was not intended to merely 
remind Africans of the age of Sino-African relations, but it was also 
a deft move to sway the Africans to the Chinese side. At that time, 
however, there was no o!cial follow-up from China to formalize its 
relationship with Africa. As a matter of fact, the Vice President of 
China’s Ministry of War burnt all the archival records documenting 
Zheng’s voyages in 1479. "is was apparently to delete any hint of past 
tendencies or interest in overseas territory, and to lay the foundation 
of China’s isolationist policy. Other o!cial policies that followed1 did 
not encourage Sino-African relations until much later (Adama 2008, 
11). In essence, it can be argued that the Sino-African relationship 
was largely spasmodic in the #fteenth century and remained cold until 
the era of decolonization and actual attainment of independence in 
African history. 
"e dynamics of the relationship can, therefore, be better 
appreciated in the context of the colonial experiences of China and 
Africa in terms of their subjection to foreign domination, their struggle 
for and attainment of independence, and their post-independence 
development challenges and the attached sentiments. Following the 
founding of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter called CCP) 
in 1921, nationalism grew to become a major platform for unity and 
the unbending desire to create and develop a modern state of China, 
having bene#ted tremendously from the political doctrine of Sun Yat-
sen, who had founded the Guomidang (Nationalist Party) in 1912. 
"e doctrines are captured in Sun’s "ree Principles of the People, 
which included nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010b). "is growth of nationalism has also 
given a new impetus and a modern outlook to China as a country 
that was irrevocably set on the path of international integration, 
thus compelling the related need to seek overseas investments and 
promotion of foreign economic interface. However, it is pertinent to 
note that China’s international integration agenda was not predictable 
given the circumstances, as it was shifting in nature and character. 
With the Soviet Union’s assistance, it was easy for Sun’s Nationalist 
Party and the CCP to join forces, particularly so because veterans (like 
Mao Zhedong and Zhou Enlai) of the latter had been active players 
in the former. Rivalry began between Chiang Kai-Shek and Zhedong 
after the death of Sun in 1925. Kai-Shek emerged leader of the left 
wing of the Goumidang while Zhedong led the CCP. From about 
1949, the international integration of China implied bowing to the 
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whims of Stalin who, for example, wanted Zhedong to ensure survival 
of the Goumidang in South China. Zhedong’s refusal led to frosty 
diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union. Eventually, 
Kai-Shek moved his forces and supporters to Taiwan and instituted a 
centrally planned and state-dominated economic policy, although with 
some measure of free operation granted to small-scale ventures. !is 
decision stimulated the economic success of Taiwan (Wu 2005).
!e Zhedong-Kai-Shek confrontation, as it played out in 
China’s civil war, provided the root for the Sino-Soviet split of the 
Cold War years, which led to a further shift in China’s international 
integration. All these combined to mark a fundamental change in 
China’s foreign relations, encapsulated under the “open-door policy,” 
which was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, to open China to 
foreign businesses that wanted to invest in the country. !is policy 
set into motion the economic transformation of modern China. It 
was carried out in two stages. !e "rst stage covered the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and included the decollectivization of agriculture, the 
opening of the country to foreign investment, and the permission for 
entrepreneurs to start businesses as its cardinal provisions. However, 
most industries remained state-owned. !e second stage of the policy 
began in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. !e main provisions 
were the privatization and outsourcing of many of the state-owned 
industries, the lifting of price controls and some protectionist policies 
and regulations. However, state monopolies were retained in sectors 
such as banking and petroleum(Yeh 1993, 124–51). Its ultimate aim 
was to fast-track economic reform by promoting a market economy, 
encouraging international interaction with the West, and thus 
stimulating investment #ows into China and the exchange of technical 
know-how with the West (Zhu 2001, 1–2, 14). From 1978 until 2013, 
China’s open-door policy resulted in 
unprecedented growth with the economy increasing by 9.5% 
a year. China’s economy surpassed that of Japan in 2010 as 
Asia’s largest economy and became the second largest after 
the United States and is projected to become the world’s 
largest economy by 2025. (ibid.)
!is is what came to be known as pragmatic nationalism. While 
attempting to maintain and promote national independence and 
an ideology-based foreign policy in the process of international 
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interaction, the CCP promoted the use of nationalist sentiments to 
strengthen the people’s sense of unity and stimulate a phenomenal 
power status for China, based on the traditional principles of harmony 
(Miller 2010). It will be recalled that the Opium Wars of the mid-
1800s had in!icted on the people a strange mix of shame and pride, 
and thus led to an inferiority complex against the steadily advancing 
West. "is became the launching pad of a new sense of nationalism 
in the twentieth century. Hence, pragmatic nationalism emerged after 
the open-door policy of the late 1970s, as a means to complement 
the Four Cardinal Values promoted by Deng Xianpoing to unify the 
people. "ese values included keeping to the socialist road, upholding 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the leadership of the 
Communist Party, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zhedong’s thought. 
An aspect of this new Chinese foreign policy orientation that 
is of interest to the present study is the incorporation of long-term 
goals of social and economic development with strong emphasis 
on independence and peace (Shambaugh 1996, 205). China was, 
therefore, moving from the containment of the earlier years to an era 
of more robust engagement with the outside world. Essentially, the 
o#cial mindset in China was that promotion of peaceful development 
was a means to achieve the national interests of industrialization and 
economic stability without compromising international objectives of 
global peace and harmony (Miller 2010). It was in such a context 
that President Hu Jintao launched the harmonious rise foreign 
policy dialogue in 2005, which in more ways than one, was a radical 
departure from some of the afore-noted Four Cardinal Values. "us, 
this ideology of pragmatic nationalism rooted in the traditional 
principles of Confucianism was further modernized between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, amid the policy choice of selective 
usage of Confucianism and nationalist sentiment as a codifying 
ideology to secure continuous CCP rule. According to Miller (2010), 
it was “a logical choice for the Chinese political elites to look back 
to Confucian philosophy to keep the people uni$ed under their rule 
because of its strong roots in Chinese history.” "e foreign policy 
behavior of China was radically transformed as China looked out for 
all-embracing engagement with both the developed and developing 
or under-developed countries of the world. As a matter of fact, one 
of the positive elements of Chinese nationalism was a Confucianism-
based pragmatic approach to economic development, which manifests 
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in economic nationalism, a non-military and non-revolutionary 
approach, as well as the necessary con!dence in nationalism for the 
purpose of attaining state’s greatness and enhancing its increasing role 
in international a"airs (Shambaugh 1996, 205; Oksenburg 1986, 505–
9; Kokkinos 2012, 27). In other words, the CCP deployed positive 
nationalism in tandem with selective principles of Confucianism to 
determine the rules of international engagement and, at the same 
time, maintain a traditional appeal in the promotion of national unity 
and international harmony (Miller 2010).
Interestingly, some events within the global system combined to 
promote China’s new-found ideology. For instance, the post-Second 
World War wider geo-political context, as manifested in the bi-polar 
power con!guration and diplomatic fundamentals between the United 
States and defunct Soviet Union, opened a space for China to de!ne its 
own position in the emergent world order. Against the backdrop of the 
depth of the Sino-Soviet relationship on the platform of communism, 
in which China and Soviet Union were the main communist nations 
of the world, it is easy to understand the impact of the Cold War 
in re-shaping the Sino-Soviet relationship, particularly from 1960 to 
1989, when both states disagreed irredeemably on communism in the 
context of contemporary realities, thus leading to Sino-Soviet split. 
Indeed, the Cold War re-de!ned the geo-political context not only 
between United States and the Soviet Union, but also of the Sino-
Soviet relationship—and in the binary o"er of policy choice it implied, 
China decided to oppose the bi-polar power structure, and further 
chose to develop and strengthen relations with the developing and/
or under-developed nations. A good example of demonstrating this 
was the granting of an interest-free loan to Tanzania in 1970 to build 
a railway line connecting Dar es Salaam with Zambia. #e ultimate 
aim of this Global South relationship was to ensure joint opposition 
to the two hegemons, and to assist China in its opening process (Zhu 
2001, 10). #is latter aspect implies that, in foreign policy, China uses 
nationalism for diplomatic and strategic reasons in order to e"ectively 
promote social stability, which is fundamentally based on immediate 
economic imperatives (Lum et al. 2009, 9–10). #is has manifested 
mainly in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, regions often referred to in 
as the Global South or the #ird World2 (Claudio 2013, 1–3).
In the case of Africa, the post-Second World War Sino-African 
relationship was kick-started in 1949 with the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Since then, China has been developing and 
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strengthening diplomatic relations with Africa. !e 1955 Bandung 
Conference represented a critical starting point of the new phase 
of Sino-African relations. It o"ered the #rst opportunity for China 
and some African countries to formally have direct diplomatic 
contact beyond the rhetorics of earlier years. For instance, during the 
conference, the Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai entertained Gamal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt as a diplomatic gesture to express desire for 
robust relations. En-Lai also met with diplomats from Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, and Libya. Beyond this diplomatic routine, 
one major point of discussion that interested African diplomats was 
the issue of Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. While En-
Lai shrugged o" criticisms of communism, the conference, at least, 
reached a consensus in which “colonialism in all of its manifestations” 
was condemned, implicitly censuring the Soviet Union, as well as the 
West. But, unfortunately, the African diplomats lacked conviction in 
the use of their Pan-Africanism platform to maintain a loud voice 
against communism. It would seem that as emergent nations pre-
occupied with the biting challenge of development, the African 
diplomats opted for caution. As events turned out later, some African 
leaders embraced the Soviet Union. 
Starting with formal establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Egypt on 30 May 1956, China has had formal relations with #fty-
one out of the #fty-three independent African States, and currently 
maintains such relations with forty-#ve of them (China Embassy 
Report, 2013). !ere was a further shift in China’s foreign policy 
behavior from pragmatic nationalism to internationalism in the 
decolonization years. Recall that from 1949, the CCP had contended 
with the challenge of uneasy connection between Chinese nationalism 
and Communist internationalism. Ordinarily, the internationalism of 
the proletariat
reflects and expresses the international community and 
identity of the fundamental interests among the proletarians 
of the world in their struggle against capitalism and for the 
victory of socialism and communism, and as such it requires 
unity of action by the working class of all nations and 
countries. (Anghelov et al. 1982, 50)
To underscore the need for blending Chinese nationalism with 
Communist internationalism, Zhedong had written in 1938 that 
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Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism 
with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and 
patriots . . . Only by achieving national liberation will it be 
possible for the proletariat and other working people to 
achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and 
the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of 
other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation patriotism 
is applied internationalism. (Zhedong 1938, 520–21, cited in 
Zhimin 2005, 41)
Predictably, this did not enjoy the endorsement of Soviet Union. 
But the Chinese leadership could not hide their true position for too 
long. As Zhimin (2005, 42) notes;
Obviously, Chinese leaders could not pretend that pursuing 
nationalistic agenda was equal to practicing internationalism 
after the PRC was founded in 1949. They had to integrate 
their nationalistic agenda with their commitment to socialist 
internationalism. This task was di!cult, particularly because 
the Soviet Union saw internationalism as the unconditional 
compliance of other socialist states to Soviet policy. The CCP 
leadership tried to pursue this double objective in China’s 
foreign policy.
While the African leaders might not necessarily embrace 
communism in its orthodox sense, the tone and persuasive impact 
of such a statement as above rubbed o! on them, so that in the 
decolonization years, they considered such remarks soothing and a 
good source of psychological support. "ey have since then seen China 
as “a good friend.” From all indications, this in#uenced the nature 
and character of the Sino-African relationship in the 1960s and even 
beyond, in the sense that they felt China shared their pain and would 
be a better foreign partner in the long run. "is impression of China 
paid o!, as China appeared to blend anti-colonial radicalism with a 
strong, practical commitment to the principle of non-interference. "e 
wave of decolonization that still raged in the 1960s across Africa made 
that decade signi$cant in the unfolding history of China’s relations 
with Africa. China o!ered generous psychological support for 
nationalist movements across Africa in their struggle for independence, 
beginning with its outbursts against colonialism in the 1955 Bandung 
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Conference. !is predictably promoted a deep feeling of solidarity and 
shared sentiments between China and Africa. Sino-African relations 
in the 1960s peaked with the visits of Premier En-lai to ten Africa 
countries between 1963 and 1964, during which he articulated the "ve 
cardinal principles3 that would govern China’s “Africa” foreign policy 
(Adama 2008, 10). Accompanied by Vice Premier Chen Yi, En-Lai 
visited the United Arab Republic (now Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, between 
13 December 1963 and 5 February 1964 (ibid.).
!e following decade witnessed a thorough strengthening of the 
China-Africa solidarity and the reinvigoration of several aspects of 
their relations. China reaped the gains of its support for the African 
struggle for independence. With a good number of them already 
enjoying diplomatic recognition by and membership in the UN in the 
1970s, African countries snubbed all Western threats and pressures, 
and supported China’s quest in 1971 for the restoration of its 
legitimate seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
Africa produced twenty-six out of the seventy-six votes in China’s 
favor (Orngu 2009, 98). !is marked a crucial turning point in the 
China-Africa diplomacy. Apart from this 1971 election, however, it 
should be noted that China’s vibrant diplomacy in Africa was in a lull 
in the closing years of the 1960s up to 1982. !e Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution that was launched in June 1966 had telling 
impact, not just on the internal dynamics of China but also on its 
foreign policy. While details of this are under consideration elsewhere 
(Okajare 2014), it can be hinted here that the Revolution forced China 
to cut (or at least relax) diplomatic ties with most of the nations of 
the world. !is was worsened by the economic revolution of the late 
1970s, particularly under Deng Xiao-Ping, which foisted economic 
reform on China from 1978. While this would seem to have thawed 
the hard-line posture from the West, particularly the United States, 
it forced China o# the African diplomatic radar up until the 1980s 
( John, and John 2005, 850–54).
!e foregoing implies that from the late 1970s, the bedrock 
of China’s foreign policy changed from pragmatic nationalism to 
internationalism, which was designed as a strategy to position China 
for greater international attainment. As already indicated, having 
secured citizens’ patriotism on the threshold of nationalism, the 
internal dynamics of China, as a communist state, favored a further 
launch into internationalism. Tull (2006, 459–60) infers that China’s 
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switch from a purely nationalist policy to a more internationally 
oriented policy direction, as well as its particular interest in Africa, 
are core elements of a larger strategy, tailored to achieve a more multi-
polar and non-intervening global order and international cooperation 
on the platform of multilateral diplomacy. !e drive is thus a product 
of remarkable development in China’s foreign policy and its desire to 
be incorporated into the international system, along with the quest for 
a vantage position that can make China play a larger role on global 
politics. To a great extent, therefore, China’s foreign policy has grown 
to be more dynamic, constructive, "exible, and self-con#dent.
!e decade between 1980 and the end of the Cold War was marked 
by a substantial improvement in Sino-African relations. While there was 
continuity in China’s relations with the developed world, China gave 
greater attention to its engagement with Africa and other developing 
countries. In 1982, China appeared to have shed the lull of the 1970s, 
as Zhao Ziyang, China’s Premier visited Africa and announced the 
new form of cooperation that China wished to pursue with Africa. He 
added four additional principles to those earlier enunciated by En-Lai 
in 1963–1964. !ese included equality in relations, diversi#cation in 
terms of cooperation for mutual development, e$ectiveness of aid for 
Africa, and a bilateral approach to the China-Africa axis (Orngu 2009, 
98; and Adama 2008, 11–12). A close scrutiny of these principles would 
readily indicate that China’s relationship with Africa was assuming an 
economic dimension against the international proletarianism, which 
was the old guiding principle. !is major shift was to incorporate more 
geo-political and geo-economic interests than the previous strategy 
of working with Africa to boost Chinese power and create a “!ird 
World Movement” coalition of less industrialized states (Mensah 
2010, 96). In a similar vein, it has been observed that the renewed pro-
Africa shift is a re"ection of a change in China’s international interests 
and diplomatic calculations from political objectives to that in which 
economic considerations predominate more than anything else (Yin 
and Vaschetto 2011, 45). !is agrees with the common expression in 
diplomacy that self-preservation is the #rst law of survival. !is can 
be understood within the context of China’s fairly steady growth rate 
following the afore-noted 1978 economic revolution/reform. Such 
growth rate could only be sustained with an assurance of steady supply 
of natural resources, which are readily available in Africa. 
China was also constrained to return fully to Africa by reason of 
the strategic need to roll back Taiwan’s diplomatic gains in the years 
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of China’s absence. !is was a move to sustain the “One China” policy, 
which de"nes the view that there is only one state called “China,” 
despite the existence of two governments that claim to be “China.” 
At the diplomatic level, this means that countries seeking diplomatic 
relations with the PRC (People’s Republic of China) must break 
o#cial relations with the Republic of China (ROC) and vice versa. 
!is came to a head in 1989 after the Tiananmen Massacre tragedy, 
which led to China’s isolation by the West. China considered Africa 
a trusted old friend and ally to return to. !is was more so in view 
of the pressing need for China to de"ne its place and image in the 
contemporary international system, following the sudden end of the 
Cold War in 1989, which left in its wake the uncontested international 
hegemony of the United States.
State visits by a number of China’s o#cials appear to be the main 
foreign policy instrument with which China pursued a vigorous, more 
active and all-embracing foreign policy of cooperation with Africa in 
the 1990s. !e policy was still targeted at the aforementioned needs and 
at deepening the scope and intensity of China-Africa relations. In May 
1996, President Jiang Zemin visited Africa and proposed a "ve-point 
agenda for strengthening the Sino-African relationship, which re$ect 
and reveal the relationship’s historical background and contemporary 
realities: to foster a sincere friendship and become each other’s reliable, 
all-weather friends; to treat each other as equals and respect each 
other’s sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal 
a%airs; to seek common development on the basis of mutual bene"ts; 
to enhance consultation and cooperation in international a%airs; and 
to look into the future and create a more splendid world (Orngu 2009, 
113). !ese fundamental points were designed by China to prepare the 
Sino-African relationship for the new millennium, which was bound 
to witness a new phase of international engagements, particularly in 
view of the collapse of bi-polar power structure via the sudden end of 
the Cold War in 1989.
Towards the above end, China began to re-enact African sentiments 
and solidarity in the dying years of the twentieth century to the year 
2000, by projecting itself as a developing nation—at least to the 
African audience. Such portrayal was to underscore the quasi-natural 
convergence of interests between China, as the biggest developing 
country, and Africa, as the continent with the largest concentration 
of developing states (President Jiang, quoted in People’s Daily 2000). 
China simultaneously asserted its superior international stature by 
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using its permanent seat in the UN Security Council to position itself 
as mentor to Africa and champion of Africa’s interests. Consequently, 
China has called for fairer global trade, debt cancellation, enlargement 
of the UN Security Council, and support for Africa’s reform-oriented 
initiatives, like NEPAD and AU. China has also been directly involved 
in peace-keeping operations in Africa. In 2003, for example, China 
sent 558 soldiers to Liberia, following the latter’s severance of ties with 
Taiwan. China sent in about 1,400 troops to nine missions in Africa in 
2004 (Tull 2006, 462–63). !e new millennium phase of Sino-African 
relations was fully launched with the establishment of the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 as an institutional 
framework to guide Sino-African relations in the twenty-"rst century. 
!is forum provides for a triennial meeting to discuss issues of common 
interest and cooperation. It has been opined that FOCAC provides 
a framework for China’s re-engagement with Africa in the twenty-
"rst century, and openly states renewed and ampli"ed intentions of 
multifaceted relations with the continent, based predominantly on 
trade and economic issue areas, but to the mutual bene"t of China 
and the particular African countries involved (Enuka 2011, 190). !is 
has continued under President Hu Jing-Tao and Premier Wen Jiabao. 
On the strength of the above, it can be surmised that, from its 
active origin in the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Sino-African 
relations had a fairly lengthy and eventful history spanning many 
decades. Since then, China and Africa have maintained a good 
measure of consistency in their intercourse, save for the lull from 1966 
to 1970. !erefore, the active phase of Sino-African relations grew 
from the stage of politico-ideological contact of the 1950s to a full-
#edged economic engagement as we see it today. !e Sino-African 
relationship has reached such an enviable peak that other major actors 
particularly of the Western extraction (particularly the United States), 
feel threatened, thus provoking a Sino-Western rivalry and emplacing 
Africa as the theater of the attendant intrigues. 
Arising from the foregoing explication is that, following their 
attainment of independence, many African states began to formalize 
diplomatic relations with China, while a few others related with Taiwan. 
!e nature and character of Sino-African relations as encapsulated in 
China’s “Africa” policy have changed drastically since 1976, after the 
death of Mao Zhedong. !is was in the context of China’s open policy 
engineered by Deng Xiaoping, which embraced more robust and deep 
engagement with developing countries. !e main elements of modern 
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China’s engagement with Africa can be well understood on three 
planks, namely: trade and investment, foreign loans and aid, and debt 
cancellation. !ese three are deliberately designed to promote China’s 
“strategic diplomacy, ideological values and commercial bene"t” 
(Haroz 2011, 68). 
A few instances su#ce here. China’s trade and investment in 
Africa, which recorded its "rst wave in 1981 and stood at about 
US$660,000, rose exponentially to US$24 million four years later. 
!ere was a steady growth throughout the last years of the twentieth 
century. !e formation of FOCAC in 2000 became the "nal launching 
pad for the promotion of China-Africa trade relations. While China’s 
trade with Africa stood at over US$32 million in 2005, its foreign 
direct investment was well over US$900 million in the same period. 
By 2006, annual African exports to China rose by over 40 percent 
(Kwesi and Delphine 2008, 41–42; Maxi 2007, 78–82). !e trend has 
witnessed consistent rise since then, such that China forages into all 
major sectors of the economies of many African states and constitutes 
a major threat to the traditional Western hegemony. 
China’s economic diplomacy in Africa has equally manifested 
in the banking sector. !is began with China’s enlistment into the 
membership of the World Bank in 1980 and that of the African 
Development Bank (ADB) in 1985. !is o$ered China the ample 
opportunity to bid on projects "nanced by these "nancial bodies. 
Its membership of ADB as a non-African state is particularly 
interesting as a strategic position to enable China to penetrate the 
economies of African states. !is development has deepened China’s 
economic engagements with Africa and facilitated the strengthening 
of a South-South economic collaboration to the discom"ture 
of the West. China also established three banks in 1994 as it was 
strengthening its "nancial sector by way of reform. !ey included 
China Development Bank, China Export Import Bank, and China 
Agricultural Development Bank. While these banks were under 
government control, according to Haroz (2011, 69), they were to 
make money. In other words, they had to operate as conventional 
banking institutions with the attendant shrewdness. !ere is also 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which is 
arguably the world’s largest bank in terms of market capitalization. 
In 2007, the ICBC indicated its interest to acquire a 20-percent stake 
in South Africa’s Stanbic Bank, in a deal that would be the biggest 
foreign direct investment in post-Apartheid South Africa (Kwesi and 
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Delphine 2008, 42). For the most parts of China’s trade relations 
with Africa since 2000, these banks have been the main vehicles that 
drive China’s trade and investment. 
In view of the pressing need of oil in the Chinese economy in 
recent years, China has had to forage into the oil industry in some 
African states, including Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Chad, Algeria, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Taylor (2005, 45) notes that
China has been faithfully developing linkages with oil-
rich countries in Africa such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. 
Since around 1995, China has pursued an “outward-looking 
oil economy” policy. This is for primary economic reasons 
as the average production cost of Chinese onshore oil is 
comparatively very expensive compared to African or Middle 
East oil.
In 2005, China was consuming about 60 percent of Sudan’s 
oil and, in 2006, claimed to have acquired 45 percent stake in a 
Nigerian o!shore oil and gas "eld. #is trend has remained unabated 
since then. Today, it can be conveniently asserted that China has a 
multi-billion dollar investment in African oil and gas (Taylor 2006, 
941–45). It goes without saying that this massive investment is a 
direct consequence of China’s pressing need, which in turn is the 
primary factor underpinning the recent remarkable improvement 
in Sino-African relations. In the last two decades, China has grown 
to be a net importer of oil (mainly from Africa), while it had been 
projected earlier that this would be about 45 percent of its oil use by 
2010 (Falola and Genova 2005, 72).#is oil diplomacy is bu!ered 
by Chinese diversi"ed heavy investment in developing African 
infrastructural facilities, like housing, schools, roads and rail lines, as 
well as telecommunications (Maxi 2007, 81).
Closely connected with the above is China’s policy on foreign 
aid and loans to Africa. #is began as early as the 1950s when many 
African countries were still embroiled in their anti-colonial struggles, 
and still continues till the present time. Wenping (2008, 15–20) has 
categorized the periods of China’s aid in Africa to two: 1956 to the 
late 1970s, which he sees as time of idealism and political drive; and 
the late 1970s to the present, a period of pragmatism and economic 
drive. It can be inferred also that the main features of China’s aid in 
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Africa include non-conditionality, emphasis on bilateral aid projects, 
and focus on strong hardware projects (e.g., physical infrastructure). 
In addition, China has provided more favorable loan terms to Africa. 
In fact, China’s aid and investment in Africa typify a bundle of 
grants and loans given at concessional and commercial rate interests. 
Such loans are subsidized through its aid budget and its granting of 
lower interest rates than those obtained in conventional commercial 
lending out!ts. "e Angolan experience su#ces here for illustration. 
Chinese aid was provided for Angola at rates 0.75–1.25 percent, with 
a generous grace period compared to those of Western commercial 
lenders such as Standard Chartered Bank, which o$ered no grace 
period and required faster repayment (Brautigam 2010). Haroz (2011, 
74) strengthens this argument by saying, “Although not all Chinese 
loans carry such favourable terms, many of them beat or match what 
is available from other sources.”
"e other leg of China’s “Africa” policy is debt cancellation. While 
China appeared reluctant on debt-related initiatives at !rst, the whole 
content of China’s !nancial policy was widened in the context of the 
establishment of FOCAC. At the !rst meeting of FOCAC in 2000 
in Beijing, China made a commitment to cancel about 156 overdue 
African debts to the tune of about US$1.3 billion in two years. 
More fundamental steps were taken in the 2003 and 2006 meetings 
of FOCAC.4 Two of the direct consequences of the meetings are 
germane for note here: one, in 2007, China hosted the annual meeting 
of the ADB and announced the plan to provide US$20 billion 
in infrastructure and trade !nancing for Africa over the next three 
years; and two, the China-Africa Development Fund was formally 
established. "e trend appears to have been the same since then.
"e foregoing represents a cursory illustration of China’s deep 
in!ltration into Africa. What can be surmised from it is that China 
has gained major footholds in areas that were traditionally reserved 
as exclusive spheres of Western in%uence in Africa. What is more, 
the trend appears unstoppable—at least in the foreseeable future, as 
China’s presence in Africa is very pervasive. As Chan (quoted from 
Kwesi and Delphine 2008, 46) has pointed out;
The Chinese are not just about everywhere, they are in most 
places Western nations are not. The Chinese diaspora run 
everything from grocery stores and building material shops 
to restaurants and corner stores in even the most remote 
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provincial towns throughout Africa. Beijing has zeroed in 
on pariah states like Sudan where Western firms are either 
barred by sanctions or constrained from doing business 
because of concerns over human rights, repressive policies, 
labour standards and security issues. Chinese construction 
firms have been contracted to rebuild Nigeria’s railroads, pave 
Rwanda’s and Ethiopia’s main roads, build Ethiopia’s Tekezze 
Dam and Sudan’s oil pipeline network, and reconstruct 
the continent’s electricity grids and telecommunications 
networks.
Predictably, while the West is apprehensive and rattled to the 
level of paranoia, a good number of African leaders appear more 
accommodating and receptive to China’s rising pro!le. Views of some 
African state o"cials su"ce here to buttress this position. Mgidlana5 
(2008, 50–51) states that 
The manner in which this relationship has developed is that 
it has resulted in less talk and demands for preconditions, to 
more support, trade and projects. It has been underpinned by 
pragmatism and mutually beneficial arrangements, namely, 
there would be a huge infrastructure project(s) that need to 
be delivered, a complete package o!ered, construction and 
skills transfer occurs. There is easier access to finances on 
favourable terms on terms that have as yet not lead [sic] to 
irresponsible and high indebtedness. Support to infrastructure 
provided a complete package that included the feasibility 
studies, construction and skills transfer and evaluation. These 
terms of engagement are mutually beneficial as China need 
the energy resources while Africa seeks to address key 
strategic priorities of development.
It was strategic for some African states to embrace China. A good 
example was Chad. As President Idriss Debyput it, “It used to be that 
when we had problems with our neighbours sending mercenaries to 
invade us that none of our complaints before the United Nations 
would pass, because China blocked them. Since breaking relations 
with Taiwan and opening the door to Chinese investment, we have 
been able to raise our concerns without taboo” (French and Polgreen 
2007).
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What feeds the West’s fear of China’s emergence most is China’s 
dogged and unapologetic pursuit of its age-long policy of respect for 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal a!airs of other states. 
"is has manifested in the “no-string” aid and investment of China 
in some African countries that are long overdue for economic and 
political reforms. Liu Guijin, China’s special envoy for Africa, put it 
succinctly: “We don’t attach political conditions. We have to realise 
the political and economic environment [in Africa] are not ideal. But 
we don’t have to wait for everything to be satisfactory or human rights 
to be perfect [before we engage with a country]” (Brautigam 2009, 
284; interpolations mine). For this, China has been severely castigated, 
particularly by the West, and there is growing discontent between 
China and the West, whose donor agencies give grants and aid that 
usually come with strings attached, like the demand for imposition of 
strict #scal austerity measures.
CONCLUSION: AFRICA IN THE VORTEX
"e aforementioned elements and others (not captured herein for 
want of space) of China’s “Africa” policy have deepened the scope 
and intensity of Sino-Africa relations, and, in turn, have provoked 
a fresh Sino-Western rivalry, as it has been playing out in Africa in 
recent times. "e sustenance of this trend implies a drastic decrease 
in the entrenched Western in$uence in Africa, as China has o!ered 
an alternative mutually bene#cial political and economic relationship, 
forcing the United States and European Union to cope with the 
unpleasant reality of a new challenger capable of upturning the 
status quo. "e alternative is one of binary dimensions, namely, as 
a development model and as a partner. Having liberated a greater 
majority of its huge population out of poverty in the last few years, 
China represents a good model and a platform of courage for 
Africa with similar experience of foreign domination. Also, it goes 
without saying that China’s relationship with Africa is largely one of 
partnership and not superior-subordinate engagement, compared to 
Africa’s experience with Western Powers and institutions. As Dowden 
(2009, 497) notes;
African leaders use China’s very interest in Africa, and its 
tempting condition-free loans, as leverage against the 
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demands of the IMF, the World Bank and Western donors. 
Since the end of the Cold War, African leaders have had almost 
no foreign partners other than the West and no alternative 
model except the Western reform agenda based on multi-
party democracy, free market and free press. Governments 
that are resistant to these reforms see China as a lifeline.
!ere is no denying that leaders and commoners in many parts 
of Africa share the foregoing view about China vis-à-vis the West. 
Generally, the nature and character of China’s engagement with 
Africa are such that China is now a preferred friend in Africa, and 
indices for this pleasant Sino-African interface appear growing by the 
day. Yet, in view of their structural and functional weaknesses, African 
countries lack the diplomatic spine to frontally demonstrate their 
preference, thus leading to entrenchment of the Sino-Western rivalry. 
!e implication for Africa in this rivalry is that a new trajectory of 
neo-imperialism has been unfurled on the continent. African states’ 
power of negotiation is further depleted, while the whole gamut of 
its diplomacy is patently weakened. For instance, the Sino-Western 
interests in Africa have not considerably promoted African interest on 
a global space, like the UN. It has remained a situation of keeping the 
continent active only as supplier of primary products. Africa remains 
a land of endless con"icts, however, and thus remains at the mercy of 
the more powerful partners.  
Africa, therefore, is deeply enmeshed in the vortex of intrigues 
of purposive neo-imperialists from both divides of the global geo-
polity: the West from Global North, and China from Global South. 
Incidentally, both are running capitalist economies, with the former 
having a long history of capitalism and the latter with a capitalist 
economy in transition. Both are avid hunters for inexhaustible 
sources of raw materials and overseas markets for their #nished 
products. !e implications of this include (but is not limited to) the 
deepening expatriate hegemony on African economies, in which case, 
well-educated African engineers and other construction workers are 
employed only as subordinates to averagely (if not poorly) educated 
Chinese technicians who ordinarily cannot #t in to the Chinese 
economy. !is is a continuity of the established Western tradition. 
Also, it widens the scope and deepens the intensity of skewed 
international economic order against Africa, and sti"es any chance of 
African home-grown initiative for economic development. 
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Strategically, it is in the interest of both China and the West 
that this anti-Africa setting be sustained. It would seem that, while 
ordinary African folks grumble against the trend, they are incapable to 
make their voices heard. Equally, African leaders appear helpless with 
narrow latitude of choice. Between China and the West, it is a case of 
common !xtures and di"erent approaches. #ese two classes of neo-
imperialists share a common tradition of an unbridled hunt for African 
resources and the exploitation of African labor for their metropolitan 
economies, thus leading to thoroughly skewed international economic 
order and partnership. #e only admissible di"erence lies in the nature 
of the relationship, the principles that underpin it, and the manners 
of engagement. While these are critical indices for any international 
relations issue, they are perfunctory and less fundamental if viewed in 
the context of the end-result of such engagement. 
In the instance under review, China and the West have literally 
turned Africa into a theater of their rivalry, where they work assiduously 
to outsmart each other. For example, Africa has now become a region 
of high strategic stake not for its own reason but for the economic and 
diplomatic bene!ts of the world powers. #e whole scenario depicts a 
thinly veiled scramble (Osei-Hwedie 2008, 80–90), a replica of which 
had played out among European powers in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century. Recall that the scramble was formally settled at 
the 1884–1885 Berlin “Africa” conference where Africa was sliced into 
colonial territories among European powers without consulting with 
Africans, thus preparing the continent for colonial rule. 
African leaders are, therefore, expected to wake up to the reality 
that confronts the continent in its quest for development. It should 
be noted that whatever largesse that comes from either side—like 
the recent donation of a magni!cent AU secretariat by China, or the 
generous support for peace-keeping, anti-terrorism war, and sundry 
purposes by the West—it is fraught with inherent strings, which, in the 
long run, will be against the overall interest of the recipient. #ere is no 
free lunch in international politics. If this trend continues, Africa, as 
currently con!gured in its political economy, cannot attain meaningful 
development in the sense that there will be continuous sti$ing of 
e"ective home-grown economic revival architecture. #e continent 
will only be re-chained and forced to grow backward—a position akin 
to its better forgotten colonial experience. To avoid a repeat of the 
partition, African leadership elites have to look inward and address 
critical issues of corruption, poverty, inept leadership, diseases, inter-
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ethnic tensions, and so on. !is will reduce the level of vulnerability 
of Africa and position the continent on a favorable pedestal where it 
can establish a genuine framework and platforms of engagement with 
its partners, in order to properly address pressing development needs. 
It will also empower Africa to get increased balance of trade, thereby 
contributing to mutual development and reducing the continent’s 
dependence on foreign aid, whether from China or the West. 
On the other hand, Africa must strive to leverage the binary 
streams of o"er for maximum bene#t. !is appears to be about the best 
opportunity Africa has had since independence to translate external 
support into overall welfare gains. Individual and collective approaches 
will be timely to take full advantage of this situation. !orough political 
and economic reforms, involving all African leaders and peoples of 
di"erent classes and persuasions, should be carried out where necessary. 
In other words, the human factor needs to be urgently purged in Africa 
as an ingenious means to fast-track e"ective functioning of other 
initiatives. !is is in view of the unassailable fact that it is the human 
capital that drives all other mechanisms of development to work. !is 
should be followed with a thorough re-positioning of the AU as the 
main continental architecture of African diplomacy and development. 
!e AU should be well honed as a collective mechanism to address the 
biting challenges of development in Africa in the twenty-#rst century 
and beyond.
NOTES
1 For example, new shipbuilding laws were introduced, which restricted vessels to 
smaller sizes. China’s isolationist policy, which lasted for several centuries until the 
mid-twentieth century, has been attributed to China’s policy to act as a peaceful 
international actor with no intent to acquire overseas territories.
2 China’s policy in the Global South is being interrogated in S. T. Okajare, “China in 
Africa: An Example of Contradictory Solidarity and Internalised Neo-Imperialism in 
Global South,” working paper.
3 In his dual capacity as Premier and Foreign A!airs Minister, Zhou En-Lai noted some 
key principles, including respect of sovereignty, non-interference in other nation’s 
a!airs, and support for Africa’s development. But he clearly mentioned the five 
principles, which were sincere friendship, equal treatment in relations, working for 
common development, building on their cooperation and solidarity, and working 
towards a common future.
4 These two meetings were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Beijing, China, 
respectively. In the former, tari!-free concession on export was granted to some 
African countries, and financial assistance was stepped up for the African Human 
Resources Development Fund. Moreover, the first China-Africa Business Conference 
was held, where more than 500 African and Chinese businessmen negotiated and 
signed twenty-one cooperation deals to the total tune of US$1 billion. The latter 
meeting was more remarkable, as the following were the main deals as announced 
by President Hu Jing-Tao: the doubling of the 2006 level of assistance provision of 
$5 billion as preferential loans, the creation of the China-Africa Development Fund 
of $5 billion to support investment of Chinese companies’ investment in Africa, the 
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construction of a conference center for the AU, the debt forgiveness of over $1.3 
billion overdue by 2005, the increase of zero-tari! export items to China from 190 
to 440 from LCDs, the setting up of three to five Sino-African trade and economic 
zones, the training of professionals for Africa, and the construction of thirty local 
hospitals and a hundred rural schools.
5 G. Mgidlana was Special Advisor to the Chief Executive O"cer on New Partnerships 
for Africa’s Development.
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